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[New Australian human rights legislation has created novel 
‘dialogues’ between different arms of government. In Victoria 
and the ACT courts have been empowered to make declarations 
of incompatibility to the Attorney-General regarding the human 
rights acts and other legislation. This article examines the 
Constitutional implications for a similar mechanism in a 
proposed Commonwealth Human Rights Act] 
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
The Australian Capital Territory was the first Australian jurisdiction to enact 
a Bill or Charter of Human Rights with its Human Rights Act 2004 (the ACT 
Human Rights Act). Victoria became the first Australian State to do so when 
it passed the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (the 
Victorian Charter). These laws have given fresh impetus to attempts to enact 
a Charter at the national level. New Matilda, an independent online magazine 
and policy portal, has drafted a Human Rights Bill (the New Matilda Bill) 
and has campaigned to have it introduced into the Federal Parliament.1  
                                                
* PhD Candidate, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University 
of New South Wales. 
** Anthony Mason Professor and Director, Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, 
Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales; Barrister, New South Wales Bar. 
We thank Anna Saulwick and Shreeya Muthusamy for their research assistance and 
the anonymous referee.  
 
1 See www.humanrightsact.com.au (4 December 2006). 
       DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                        
VOLUME 12 NO 1 
2
Both the ACT and Victorian Acts were the subject of extensive community 
consultation.2 New Matilda has also invited comment from members of the 
public.3 These processes have produced legislation that is not based on the 
United States Bill of Rights, in which the Supreme Court can strike down 
inconsistent legislation. The Australian laws contain no such power, and are 
instead designed to foster a “human rights culture”4 in which rights play a 
prominent role in the formulation, interpretation and review of laws and 
policies. 
  
Each of the Australian laws contains mechanisms to protect human rights 
through a form of “dialogue” between the arms of government. Whether or 
not dialogue5 is the correct word for what the laws achieve, it is clear that 
they create new and innovative forms of deliberation and interaction for 
law, policy and politics as they relate to human rights. This interaction is 
focused upon the consistency of laws with the rights included in the human 
rights instrument.6 Under the ACT Human Rights Act courts have the power 
                                                
2 ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, Legislative Assembly of the 
Australian Capital Territory, Towards an ACT Human Rights Act (2003), 13; Human 
Rights Consultation Committee, Rights, Responsibility and Respect: The Report of 
the Human Rights Consultation Committee (2005). 
3 See 
www.humanrightsact.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63&It
emid=33 (1 November 2006). 
4 Elizabeth Kelly, Acting CEO, ACT Department of Justice and Community Safety, 
“How Does the ACT Human Rights Act Protect Human Rights?” (Paper presented at 
the Conference on Australia’s First Bill of Rights, Australian National University, 
Canberra, 1 July 2004) 1, Human Rights Consultation Committee, above n 2, 92. 
5 For the initial use of this now widely used the term, see Peter W Hogg and Allison 
A Bushell “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures” (1997) 35 
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 75. This use of the “dialogue” metaphor has provoked 
intense debate in Canada. See Christopher P Manfredi and James B Kelly “Six 
Degrees of Dialogue: A Response to Hogg and Bushell” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 513 and the further response by Peter W Hogg and Allison A Thornton 
“Reply to ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue’” (1999) 37 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 529. 
Amongst the now large volume of literature, see also Kent Roach, The Supreme 
Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue (2001) and for an 
Australian treatment Leighton McDonald, “Rights, “Dialogue” and Democratic 
Objections to Judicial Review” (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 1. 
6 ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, above n 2, 61–68. Human Rights 
Consultation Committee, Parliament of Victoria, above n 2, 66-68 and New Matilda, 
“Human Rights Act for Australia”; Explanatory Information (2006) A Human Rights 
Act for Australia 
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to make a “declaration of incompatibility” in respect of a Territory law.7 The 
New Matilda Bill allows the judiciary to make a similarly named declaration,8 
while the Victorian Charter empowers Victorian courts to issue a 
“declaration of inconsistent interpretation” that operates in the same manner.9 
 
These declaratory mechanisms alert the legislature and the executive that a 
court has identified an incompatibility between a protected human right and 
another statute. In each case the declaration10 is accompanied by an 
obligation on the Attorney-General to prepare a response and to ensure that 
the declaration and the response are presented to parliament.11 A dialogue is 
thus created between the judiciary, executive and legislature that provides a 
framework in which to consider the implications, justifications and 
possibilities of reform for the law in question. A critical feature of this 
dialogue is that it maintains the final say of the legislature, preserving 
parliamentary sovereignty. 
 
In this article we examine the constitutional validity of the power to make 
declarations of incompatibility in the ACT Human Rights Act, Victorian 
Charter and New Matilda Bill. While the last has not been introduced into the 
federal Parliament,12 it does provide a useful basis from which to analyse the 
issues at the federal level. Overall, we examine the impact that the differing 
federal, state and territory constitutional frameworks have on the issue of 
                                                                                                               
www.newmatilda.com/admin/imageLibrary/images/HRA_explanatory_info%20AU
GUST%202006lPGr3VU321J2.doc at 30 October 2006, 4 
7 See s 32 of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) which is extracted below. Hereafter 
this will be cited as the ACT Human Rights Act. 
8 See s 51 of the New Matilda Human Rights Bill 2006 which is extracted below. 
The complete bill is available at 
www.humanrightsact.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&i
d=20&Itemid=34. Hereafter this will be cited as the New Matilda Bill.  
9 See s 36 of the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) which is 
extracted below. Hereafter this will be cited as the Victorian Charter. 
10 Hereafter all three declaration mechanisms will be referred to as “Declarations of 
Incompatibility”. 
11 See s 33 of the ACT Human Rights Act, s 37 of the Victorian Charter, s 51 of the 
New Matilda Bill. 
12 See New Matilda, “A Human Rights Act for Australia: Campaign Overview 
www.humanrightsact.com.au/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&i
d=19&Itemid=36 at 13 June 2007. 
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constitutional validity. To date, a court has yet to consider the validity of the 
ACT and Victorian mechanisms.13  
 
In Part II we set out the declaration mechanisms from each instrument. We 
then determine in Part III whether empowering a court to make such a 
declaration breaches the separation of judicial power mandated by Chapter III 
of the Australian Constitution. Initially, we examine whether making a 
declaration of incompatibility is an exercise of judicial power. While we 
conclude that the mechanisms do involve an exercise of judicial power and 
thus are constitutionally valid, this cannot be stated with certainty. 
Accordingly in Part IV we examine the constitutional consequences for the 
alternative that the making of such declarations is an exercise of non-judicial 
power.  
 
 
II THE DECLARATION MECHANISMS 
 
The ACT Human Rights Act, Victorian Charter and New Matilda Bill each 
contain declaration mechanisms that are alike in structure and operation. In 
the ACT Human Rights Act, s 32 provides:  
 
(1) This section applies if— 
(a) a proceeding is being heard by the Supreme Court; 
and 
(b) an issue arises in the proceeding about whether a 
Territory law is consistent with a human right. 
(2) If the Supreme Court is satisfied that the Territory law is not 
consistent with the human right, the court may declare that 
the law is not consistent with the human right (the 
declaration of incompatibility). 
 (3) The declaration of incompatibility does not affect— 
  (a) the validity, operation or enforcement of the law; or 
  (b) the rights or obligations of anyone. 
                                                
13 A search of the ACT Human Rights Act Database indicates that as at 21 June 
2007 only two cases have considered the declaration of incompatibility mechanism, 
and the constitutionality of the mechanism was not considered in either. See 
Australian National University “ACT Human Rights Act Case Database” 
acthra.anu.edu.au/cases/index.php?form_action=search&list_all=&page_num=&key
word=&year=&court=&hra_section=25&Submit=Search at 3 July 2007. The 
declaration mechanism in the Victorian Charter does not come into operation until 1 
January 2008, see s 2 of the Victorian Charter.  
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(4) The registrar of the Supreme Court must promptly give a 
copy of the declaration of incompatibility to the Attorney-
General. 
  
A second part of the mechanism in s 33 sets out how parliament is required to 
respond: 
 
 (1) This section applies if the Attorney-General receives a copy 
of a declaration of incompatibility. 
 (2) The Attorney-General must present a copy of the declaration 
of incompatibility to the Legislative Assembly within 6 
sitting days after the day the Attorney-General receives the 
copy. 
 (3) The Attorney-General must prepare a written response to the 
declaration of incompatibility and present it to the 
Legislative Assembly not later than 6 months after the day 
the copy of the declaration is presented to the Legislative 
Assembly. 
 
While the Victorian Charter refers to “declarations of inconsistent 
interpretation” rather than “declarations of incompatibility”, the similarities 
between the Victorian and ACT legislation are clear. Section 36 of the 
Victorian Charter states: 
 
(1) This section applies if — 
(a) in a Supreme Court proceeding a question of law 
arises that relates to the application of this Charter or 
a question arises with respect to the interpretation of 
a statutory provision in accordance with this Charter; 
or 
  (b) the Supreme Court has had a question referred to it 
under section 33; or 
(c) an appeal before the Court of Appeal relates to a 
question of a kind referred to in paragraph (a). 
(2) Subject to any relevant override declaration, if in a 
proceeding the Supreme Court is of the opinion that a 
statutory provision cannot be interpreted consistently with a 
human right, the Court may make a declaration to that effect 
in accordance with this section. 
(3) If the Supreme Court is considering making a declaration of 
inconsistent interpretation, it must ensure that notice in the 
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prescribed form of that fact is given to the Attorney-General 
and the Commission. 
(4) The Supreme Court must not make a declaration of 
inconsistent interpretation unless the Court is satisfied that— 
(a) notice in the prescribed form has been given to the 
Attorney-General and the Commission under sub-
section (3); and 
(b) a reasonable opportunity has been given to the 
Attorney-General and the Commission to intervene 
in the proceeding or to make submissions in respect 
of the proposed declaration of inconsistent 
interpretation. 
 (5) A declaration of inconsistent interpretation does not— 
(a) affect in any way the validity, operation or 
enforcement of the statutory provision in respect of 
which the declaration was made; or 
(b) create in any person any legal right or give rise to 
any civil cause of action. 
(6) The Supreme Court must cause a copy of a 
declaration of inconsistent interpretation to be given 
to the Attorney-General— 
(a) if the period provided for the lodging of an appeal in 
respect of the proceeding in which the declaration 
was made has ended without such an appeal having 
been lodged, within 7 days after the end of that 
period; or 
(b) if on appeal the declaration is upheld, within 7 days 
after any appeal has been finalised. 
(7) The Attorney-General must, as soon as reasonably 
practicable, give a copy of a declaration of 
inconsistent interpretation received under sub-
section (6) to the Minister administering the statutory 
provision in respect of which the declaration was 
made, unless the relevant Minister is the Attorney-
General. 
 
The obligations that result from a declaration are set out in s 37: 
 
Within 6 months after receiving a declaration of inconsistent 
interpretation, the Minister administering the statutory provision in 
respect of which the declaration was made must— 
  (a) prepare a written response to the declaration; and 
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  (b) cause a copy of the declaration and of his or her 
 response to it to be— 
   (i) laid before each House of Parliament; and  
   (ii) published in the Government Gazette. 
 
The mechanism in the New Matilda Bill adopts the same formula. Section 51 
states: 
 
(1) If a Court is satisfied that a provision of primary legislation 
is incompatible with a right or freedom set down in this Act, 
it may make a declaration of incompatibility.  
(2) If a Court is satisfied that a provision of subordinate 
legislation, made in the exercise of a power conferred by 
primary legislation, is incompatible with a right or freedom 
set down in this Act, and that the primary legislation 
concerned prevents removal of the incompatibility, it may 
make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
(3) If a Court is satisfied that a provision of subordinate 
legislation, made in the exercise of a power conferred by 
primary legislation, is incompatible with a right or freedom 
set down in this Act, and that the primary legislation 
concerned does not prevent removal of the incompatibility, it 
may invalidate that provision.  
(4) A declaration under sub-sections (1) and (2) (a declaration of 
incompatibility)  
(a) does not affect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is 
given; and  
(b) is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in 
  which it is made.  
(5) A Court must transmit a copy of any declaration of 
incompatibility to the Attorney-General. 
(6) This section applies when a court is exercising jurisdiction in 
any cause or matter pending before it. 
 
Section 52 then follows a familiar pattern: 
 
(1) This section applies if the Attorney-General receives a copy 
of a declaration of incompatibility. 
(2) The Attorney-General must present a copy of the declaration 
of incompatibility to the House of Representatives within 15 
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sitting days after the day the Attorney-General receives the 
copy. 
(3) The Attorney-General must prepare a written response to the 
declaration of incompatibility indicating what action if any is 
proposed in relation to it and the reasons for that action or 
non-action, and present it to the House of Representatives 
not later than 6 months after the day the copy of the 
declaration is presented to the House of Representatives. 
 
These mechanisms are derived from like statutes in New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) does not 
make express reference to declarations of incompatibility. The procedure was 
instead “read into” the statute by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review.14 In 2001 a declaration of 
incompatibility mechanism was inserted by legislative amendment into the 
Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ).15 
 
The mechanism can also be found in s 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK). 
Under the UK legislation a declaration of incompatibility triggers a “fast-
track” amendment process whereby the responsible Minister may make 
amendments to the Act in order to remove the inconsistency. It has not been 
suggested in the United Kingdom that this mechanism is illegitimate or 
inappropriate in the functions it confers upon courts. Instead it is often 
regarded as a model of legislative drafting in balancing the powers of the 
legislative and judicial arms of government. Judges such as Lord Steyn and 
Lord Rodger of Earlsferry have, respectively, described the Human Rights 
Act as “carefully and subtly drafted”16 and even “beautifully drafted”.17 
However, these endorsements are of little assistance in determining whether 
the declaration mechanisms in Australia are constitutionally valid. Unlike 
Australia, the United Kingdom lacks a separation of judicial power brought 
about by a written constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
14 [2000] 2 NZLR 9. 
15 Sections 92J and 92K of the Human Rights Act 1993 (NZ). 
16 R v DPP; Ex parte Kebeline [1999] 4 All ER 801, 831 per Lord Steyn. 
17 Wilson v First County Trust Ltd [2003] 4 All ER 97, 148 per Lord Rodger of 
Earlsferry. 
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III AN EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER? 
 
The separation of judicial power brought about by Chapter III of the 
Constitution entails two consequences. As Dixon J recognised in Victorian 
Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd and Meakes v Dignan,18 
“the Parliament is restrained both from reposing any power essentially 
judicial in any other organ or body, and from reposing any other than that 
judicial power in such tribunals”. Hence, the Constitution requires that: 
1. only Chapter III courts (that is, courts created under s 71 of the 
Constitution) be conferred with judicial power; and 
2. Chapter III courts cannot be conferred with power other than judicial 
power, except where such other power is ancillary or incidental to the 
exercise of judicial power. 
The key to both is the definition of judicial power. 
 
While there have been many attempts to define judicial power, the High 
Court has not provided a definitive list of its content or characteristics. The 
difficulty in formulating a definition has often been acknowledged. In 
Tasmanian Breweries, Windeyer J observed that “the concept seems … to 
defy, perhaps it were better to say transcend, purely abstract conceptual 
analysis”.19 In R v Quinn; Ex parte Consolidated Foods Corporation20 Aickin 
J concluded that “in substance all that the courts have been able to say 
towards a definition has been the formulation of negative propositions by 
which it has been said that no one of a list of factors is itself conclusive and 
perhaps the presence of all is not conclusive”. More recently, the Court has 
suggested that “framing a definition of judicial power that is at once 
exclusive and exhaustive” may be an “impossibility”.21 
 
In Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Deane, 
Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ explained that: 
 
 [d]ifficulty arises in attempting to formulate a comprehensive 
definition of judicial power not so much because it consists of a 
number of factors as because the combination [of factors] is not 
always the same. It is hard to point to any essential or constant 
                                                
18 (1931) 46 CLR 73, 98. 
19 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 
CLR 361, 394. 
20 (1977) 138 CLR 1, 15. 
21 Precision Data Holdings Ltd v Wills (1991) 173 CLR 167, 188 per Mason CJ, 
Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
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characteristic. Moreover, there are functions which, when performed 
by a court, constitute the exercise of judicial power but, when 
performed by some other body, do not.22 
 
Over time, the Court has articulated a series of indicia of judicial power. As 
the passage from Brandy suggests, none of these indicia are by themselves 
decisive. Whether a power can be said to be “judicial” depends upon the 
indicia present in the power being “weighed” against those which are absent, 
or against other countervailing indicia. The traditional starting point in lists of 
these indicia is the view offered by Griffiths CJ in Huddart, Parker & Co Pty 
Ltd v Moorehead:23 
 
I am of opinion that the words “judicial power” as used in sec 71 of 
the Constitution mean the power which every sovereign authority 
must of necessity have to decide controversies between its subjects, 
or between itself and its subjects, whether the rights relate to life, 
liberty or property. The exercise of this power does not begin until 
some tribunal which has power to give a binding and authoritative 
decision (whether subject to appeal or not) is called upon to take 
action. 
 
Justice Kitto further stated in Tasmanian Breweries:24 
 
Thus a judicial power involves, as a general rule, a decision settling 
for the future, as between defined persons or classes of persons, a 
question as to the existence of a right or obligation, so that an 
exercise of the power creates a new charter by reference to which 
that question is in future to be decided as between those persons or 
classes of persons. In other words, the process to be followed must 
generally be an inquiry concerning the law as it is and the facts as 
they are, followed by an application of the law as determined to the 
facts as determined; and the end to be reached must be an act which, 
so long as it stands, entitles and obliges the persons between whom it 
intervenes, to observance of the rights and obligations that the 
application of law to facts has shown to exist.  
 
                                                
22 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 
245, 267. 
23 (1909) 8 CLR 330, 357. 
24 R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 
CLR 361,374. 
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In Brandy the majority affirmed that judicial power operates by making 
decisions “according to law … by the application of a pre-existing standard 
rather than by the formulation of policy or the exercise of an administrative 
discretion”. In the same case the High Court also identified the 
“enforceability of decisions” as a critical indicia of judicial power in 
situations where the characterisation of a function “is otherwise equivocal”. 25  
 
This approach to defining “judicial power” has been praised by Lacey for 
rejecting a “formalistic approach…and focusing instead on the manner in 
which judicial power is exercised.”26 The lack of precision certainly allows 
the concept to be applied flexibly, if unpredictably. In the absence of a High 
Court precedent addressed to the issue, this means that it cannot be said with 
certainty whether the declaration of incompatibility mechanisms in the ACT 
Human Rights Act, Victorian Charter or New Matilda Bill is an exercise of 
judicial power.  
 
We address this issue by going back to first principles and the indicia of 
judicial power. At the first stage, we examine the extent to which the 
declaration mechanism exhibits the indicia of judicial power. At the second 
stage, we ask whether the declarations can be distinguished from processes 
which the court has already identified as being beyond the ambit of judicial 
power.  
 
 
 A Using Legal Standards to Resolve a Controversy? 
 
One indication of judicial power is that it is a power that requires the use of 
legal standards, as opposed to policy criteria, in determining a dispute. The 
ACT Human Rights Act, the Victorian Charter and the New Matilda Bill have 
all been drafted to ensure that this is the case. Section 32(1) of the ACT 
Human Rights Act provides that a declaration of incompatibility can be made 
if “(a) a proceeding is being heard by the Supreme Court; and (b) an issue 
arises in the proceeding about whether a Territory law is consistent with a 
human right.” Thus the ACT legislation makes it clear that a declaration can 
only be made in the context of an existing controversy between parties who 
                                                
25 Brandy v Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1995) 183 CLR 
245, 268 per Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. See also Helen Irving 
“Advisory Opinions, The Rule of Law, and the Separation of Powers” (2004) 4 
Macquarie Law Journal 105, 111. 
26 Wendy Lacey, “Inherent Jurisdiction, Judicial Power and Implied Guarantees 
Under Chapter III of the Constitution” (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 57, 73. 
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are seeking to have their rights and liabilities determined. The legislation also 
sets out the defined legal standards which courts are to use to determine 
whether to issue a declaration. Section 32(2), states that if it “is satisfied that 
the Territory law is not consistent with the human right, the court may 
declare that the law is not consistent with the human right”, and s 5 
establishes that “human right” refers to one of the “civil and political rights 
in part 3” of the Act. Hence, a declaration of incompatibility is a 
determination of the consistency of an existing law as against one or more of 
these specific legal criteria. 
 
The Victorian Charter expands the circumstances in which the Supreme 
Court might be asked to use the declaration of inconsistency mechanism. 
Section 36(1)(a) is analogous to the ACT Human Rights Act provision. It 
specifies that such a declaration may be made if “a question of law arises that 
relates to the application of this Charter or… to the interpretation of a 
statutory provision in accordance with this Charter” in proceedings before the 
Supreme Court of Victoria. A declaration can also be made if the Supreme 
Court has had a question referred to it under s 33 of the Victorian Charter. 
This section envisages a scenario where the Supreme Court will be able to 
hear a question which originated in existing proceedings “before a court or 
tribunal, a question of law … that relates to the application of … [the] 
Charter”, or the way in which statutes might be interpreted in accordance 
with the Charter. Nonetheless, a request for a declaration in Victoria will still 
only arise in a situation where an underlying controversy between two parties 
already exists. In terms of the legal standards the court is to use to determine 
whether a declaration should be issued, the Victorian Charter replicates the 
ACT Human Rights Acts reference to specific legal criteria: s 3 of the Charter 
explains that “Human Rights” refers to the “civil and political rights set out 
in Part 2”. 
 
In the New Matilda Bill “Human Rights” are defined in s 6 as “the civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights set down in part 3”. Thus this 
legislative proposal also sets up specific legal criteria by which compatibility 
with human rights can be judged. However, as originally drafted, the 
declaration of incompatibility formula adopted in the New Matilda Bill did 
not contain a requirement that such declarations could only be made in the 
context of an existing proceeding. This would have been a significant 
problem, given that judicial power can only be used where there is a 
controversy between two parties. This has been rectified in the final version 
of the proposal launched in August 2006. The Bill now contains s 51(6), 
which indicates a court has the power to make a declaration of 
incompatibility “when a court is exercising jurisdiction in any cause or matter 
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pending before it”. This ensures that a declaration could only be issued in the 
context of an existing controversy between parties. 
 
It is also possible to argue that issuing a declaration resolves the controversy 
between the parties. As such the making of a declaration can be distinguished 
from the situation in Solomons v District Court of New South Wales.27 That 
case involved a costs certificate that could be issued by a court under the 
Costs in Criminal Cases Act 1967 (NSW) to a person who had been acquitted 
of an offence. A person who received the certificate was entitled to apply to 
the Under-Secretary of the NSW Attorney-General’s Department to have 
their costs of the proceedings paid for by the State. The difficulty faced by 
Mr Solomon was that he was charged with a federal rather than NSW 
offence. Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ found that 
if the District Court issued such a certificate it would be exercising “power 
not provided by Chapter III of the Constitution [because the certificate]… 
would be productive of a futility, not the resolution of any claim or 
controversy”.28 An application for a certificate would not have concluded any 
controversy given the absence of a corresponding costs recovery scheme at 
the federal level. By contrast, the ACT Human Rights Act, Victorian Charter 
and New Matilda Bill only place obligations on the Attorney-General in their 
respective jurisdiction. For example, a declaration under the ACT Human 
Rights Act only places obligations on the Attorney-General of the ACT.  
 
 
 B Binding and Authoritative? 
 
Each legislative scheme provides that declaring that a particular law is 
incompatible does not render that law invalid or affect the enforcement of the 
law.29 The ACT legislation even makes explicit that the making of such a 
declaration does not affect “the rights or obligations of anyone”.30 The 
Victorian Charter contains a slightly different formulation, indicating that a 
“declaration of inconsistent interpretation does not…create in any person any 
legal right or give rise to any civil cause of action”.31 The New Matilda Bill 
states that a declaration of incompatibility “is not binding on the parties to the 
                                                
27 (2002) 211 CLR 119. 
28 Solomons v District Court of NSW (2002) 211 CLR 119, 136. 
29 Section 32(3)(a) of the ACT Human Rights Act, s 36(5)(a) of the Victorian 
Charter and s 51(4)(a) of the New Matilda Bill. 
30 Section 32(3)(b) of the ACT Human Rights Act. 
31 Section 36(5)(b) of the Victorian Charter.  
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proceedings in which it is made”32. These limits preserve parliamentary 
sovereignty by signalling that while the judiciary has an important role in 
protecting rights, it is parliament that has the final responsibility to determine 
how any tension between rights protection and other legislation is to be 
resolved.33  
  
Despite this, the indicia of judicial power can be found in the declaration 
mechanisms. First, it is important to recognise that declarations generally 
“are statutory rather than equitable remedies”.34 This suggests that when a 
parliament bestows the power to make declarations on a court such 
declarations are intended to be statements of law. Indeed, that declarations 
are statements of law arguably lies behind the High Court’s recognition that a 
court’s power to make declarations “is confined by the considerations which 
mark out the boundaries of judicial power.”35 
 
Second, each of the mechanisms makes clear that binding obligations do flow 
once courts have declared that an incompatibility or inconsistency exists. 
Section 32(4) of the ACT Human Rights Act states that the registrar of the 
Supreme Court “must promptly give a copy of the declaration of 
incompatibility to the Attorney-General”, while s 33 imposes two duties upon 
the Attorney-General. The Attorney-General “must”, under s 33(2), “present 
a copy of the declaration of incompatibility to the Legislative Assembly 
within 6 sitting days after the day the Attorney-General receives the copy” 
and, under s 33(3), “prepare a written response to the declaration of 
incompatibility and present it to the Legislative Assembly not later than 6 
months after the day the copy of the declaration is presented to the 
Legislative Assembly”. 
 
These obligations are echoed in the Victorian Charter. Section 36(6) 
specifies that the Supreme Court must ensure that the Attorney-General is 
given a copy of the declaration “within 7 days” of the end of the period in 
which the underlying proceedings could be appealed, or “within 7 days after 
any appeal has been finalised”. Section 36(7) obliges the Attorney-General to 
                                                
32 Section 51(4)(b) of the New Matilda Bill.  
33 See ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, above n 2, 68, Human Rights 
Consultation Committee, above n 2, 86 and 88 and New Matilda, above n 6, 4. 
34 Neil J Young “Declarations and Other Remedies in Administrative Law” (2004) 
12 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 35, 37. 
35 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, 582 per Mason 
CJ, Dawson , Toohey, Gaudron JJ. See also Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Limited 
(1999) 198 CLR 334, 355-56 per Gleeson CJ. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne 
and Callinan JJ. 
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give a copy of the declaration to the “Minister administering the statutory 
provision” which has been found to be inconsistent “as soon as reasonably 
practicable” after they have received it. Section 37 is drafted in language 
which parallels that used in the ACT. This section compels the Minister 
responsible for administering the inconsistent act to respond in writing to the 
declaration and ensure that this response is tabled before “each House of 
Parliament and published in the Government Gazette”.  
 
Similarly, if the New Matilda Bill were to be enacted by the Federal 
Parliament s 51(5) requires “a Court” to provide a copy of the declaration to 
the Attorney-General. The obligations which fall on the Federal Attorney-
General once he or she had received the declaration follow the pattern of the 
Territory and State laws and are contained in s 52. The Federal Attorney-
General is required to present a copy of the declaration within 15 sitting days 
of receiving it, 36 while the Attorney-General’s mandatory written response is 
to be presented to the House of Representatives “not later than 6 months” 
after the declaration is given to the House.37  
 
Important consequences follow from the making of a declaration. These 
sections impose a duty upon the first law officer of each jurisdiction to 
respond to a declaration in parliament. This must be seen in light of the 
responsibility of ministers to parliament. In the ACT, for example, the 
Legislative Assembly can dismiss the executive by way of a no-confidence 
motion, or can pass a no-confidence motion in the Attorney-General, under 
the doctrines of responsible government (set out in ss 19 and 46 of the 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth)). The 
Assembly is also capable of amending a law that has been held to be 
incompatible by a court. While debate continues over the efficacy of 
responsible government and no-confidence motions in an era when 
parliament is characterised by party discipline and a strong executive 
power,38 for the purposes of determining whether declaration mechanisms 
contain the requisite indicia of judicial power the important point is that the 
legislation stipulates that binding obligations are triggered by a declaration. 
 
The duties imposed by the courts should also be seen in the context of the 
“dialogue” which the Acts (or proposed Act) seeks to implement. Human 
                                                
36 Section 52(2) of the New Matilda Bill. 
37 Section 52(3) of the New Matilda Bill. 
38 In relation to the situation in Victoria see, for example, Robyn Eckersley and 
Spencer Zifcak “The Constitution and Democracy in Victoria: Westminster on Trial 
(2001) 36 Australian Journal of Political Science 61, 67-68. 
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rights are intended to be interpreted and applied not only by the judiciary but 
as part of a dialogue between the judiciary, executive and legislature.39 Seen 
as part of this process, the duties imposed upon the Attorney-General are an 
important and substantive consequence of a litigant gaining a declaration of 
incompatibility. In the words of the ACT Bill of Rights Consultative 
Committee, the mechanism is a “sufficiently strong and appropriate 
enforcement mechanism to underpin the dialogue approach of the ACT 
Human Rights Act”.40 This is reflected in the Explanatory Statement for the 
Bill: 
 
The purpose of the declaration is to draw to the attention of the 
Government and the Assembly a finding of incompatibility by the 
Court. This is an essential element in the interpretive and dialogue 
model upon which the Bill is based.41  
 
The fact that the duties imposed by a declaration go beyond mere notification 
is also evident in the remarks made by the Victorian Attorney-General in 
introducing the Victorian Charter. In the second reading speech he indicated 
that the purpose of giving the power to make declarations to the courts “is to 
allow the Parliament to reconsider the provision in light of the declaration of 
inconsistent interpretation.”42 These statements demonstrate legislative 
recognition that the declaration mechanisms are an (albeit novel for 
Australia) form of legal remedy. The declarations can be viewed in this way 
because they produce foreseeable and practical consequences in response to a 
judicial finding that a law is inconsistent with a protected human right.43 
 
There is a further aspect of the power to make the declarations which impacts 
on whether it is “binding and authoritative”. Implicit in discussions of 
judicial power, such as that of Kitto J in Tasmanian Breweries, quoted above 
is that judicial power is applied to bind the parties to the proceedings. While 
                                                
39 ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, above n 2, Ch 4, See esp 66–8; 
Victoria, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly, 4 May 2006, 1290 (Robert 
Hulls), Simon Evans and Carolyn Evans, Submission to New Matilda Bill of Rights 
Campaign, 17 February 2006 available at 
www.newmatilda.com/admin/imagelibrary/images/eIYl15Ocb7Dy.doc ( 8 
September 2006). 
40 ACT Bill of Rights Consultative Committee, above n 2, 67. 
41 Explanatory Statement 6, Human Rights Bill 2003 (ACT) 6. 
42 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates Legislative Assembly, 4 May 2006, 1293 (Robert 
Hulls). 
43 By contrast, the available explanatory material about the New Matilda Bill is, of 
course, limited.  
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we have found that obligations bestowed by the declaration mechanisms are 
binding, it is the Attorney-General and not the parties who are bound by these 
obligations. That the declarations are not binding on the parities is a relevant 
(albeit negative) factor in determining whether the power is judicial. 
However, it is not of itself decisive. On balance, we find that the power is 
judicial when this is weighed against other indicia that more strongly indicate 
an exercise of judicial power. 
 
 
 C Is a Declaration Enforceable? 
 
High Court decisions such as Brandy indicate that if declarations of 
incompatibility are unenforceable they are unlikely to be recognised as an 
expression of judicial power. Lacey and Wright state that satisfying this 
indicia might be problematic because under such a mechanism courts are 
unable to “enforce positive compliance with the human rights upon which the 
declaration would be based”.44 However, these authors provide a solution to 
this dilemma by adopting a more expansive understanding of the 
enforceability requirement. They suggest that a declaration may nevertheless 
fall within the definition of an exercise of judicial power “provided it is 
conclusive of the controversy regarding inconsistency”.45 They recognise that 
this could only be the case where the factual circumstances giving rise to the 
incompatibility can be “merged in the judgement”.46 
 
Courts already apply judicial power to issue declarations which conclude 
controversies in a broad range of circumstances. At common law the scope 
for the making of declarations is very wide.47 While a declaration will not be 
granted where the issue is hypothetical or where it “will produce no 
foreseeable consequences for the parties”,48 it may be granted where a dispute 
involves future rights and obligations49 or where the party seeking the 
                                                
44 Wendy Lacey and David Wright, “Highlighting Inconsistency: The Declaration as 
a Remedy in Administrative Law and International Human Rights Standards” in 
Chris Finn (ed) Shaping Administrative Law for the Next Generation: Fresh 
Perspectives (2005) 32, 54. 
45 Ibid 55. See also Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Limited (1999) 198 CLR 334, 355 
per Gleeson CJ. Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ. 
46 Lacey and Wright, above n 44, 55. 
47 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564, 581-582 per 
Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron JJ. 
48 Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority (NSW) (1977) 18 ALR 55, 69.  
49 Commonwealth v Sterling Nicholas Duty Free Pty Ltd (1972) 126 CLR 297. 
       DEAKIN LAW REVIEW                                                                                        
VOLUME 12 NO 1 
18
declaration may have no other cause of action.50 The case of Mellifont v 
Attorney-General (Queensland)51 established that even the existence of 
practical consequences for the plaintiff is not a strict requirement for the 
granting of declaratory relief.  
 
Hence, a court may grant a “bare declaration that some legal requirement has 
been contravened” where this “will serve to redress some or all of the harm 
brought about by [the] contravention”.52 As High Court’s rules provided: “A 
proceeding is not open to objection on the ground that a merely declaratory 
judgment or order is sought by the proceeding, and the Court may make 
binding declarations of right in an action or other proceeding whether any 
consequential relief is or could be claimed in that action or proceeding or 
not”.53 This rule has not been replicated in the replacement High Court Rules 
2004 that came into operation from 1 January 2005, but is found in the rules 
of other Federal and State courts.54 
 
Other Australian laws grant a power to make declarations not unlike 
declarations of incompatibility. An example is the power of courts to make 
“Declarations of contravention” under s 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth). Subsection (1) states: “If a Court is satisfied that a person has 
contravened 1 of the following provisions, it must make a declaration of 
contravention”. It then lists a number of provisions and in a note states: 
“Once a declaration has been made ASIC can then seek a pecuniary penalty 
order (section 1317G) or (in the case of a corporation/scheme civil penalty 
provision) a disqualification order (section 206C)”.55 Hence, as the note 
explains, such a declaration can be made without necessarily affecting rights 
and obligations. 
 
                                                
50 Dyson v Attorney-General [1911] 1 KB 410. See also Croome v Tasmania (1997) 
191 CLR 119. 
51 (1991) 173 CLR 289, 303-306 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and 
McHugh JJ. 
52 Truth About Motorways Pty Ltd v Macquarie Infrastructure Investment 
Management Ltd (2000) 200 CLR 591, 613, giving Ainsworth v Criminal Justice 
Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 as an example. 
53 High Court Rules 1952, Order 26, rule 19. 
54 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21; Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 
75; Supreme Court Act 1986 (Vic) s 36; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 31; 
Supreme Court Act 1979 (NT) s 18; Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 25(6); Court 
Procedure Rules 2006 (ACT) rule 2900; Supreme Court Rules 2000 (Tas) rule 
103.1–2. 
55 Emphasis added. 
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These examples show how declarations are commonly accepted as remedies 
capable of putting an end to controversies before the court. Declarations of 
incompatibility are similar in providing a conclusion to a controversy about 
the incompatibility of other legislation with the protected human rights. In 
this, they relate to the legal question in issue as it arises out of the matter 
brought before the court. As in constitutional litigation, a declaration would 
state that the Act in question, given the circumstances in which it has been 
brought before the court, is inconsistent with the relevant human right spelt 
out in the legislation. The controversy is thereby “concluded” by the court in 
one of two ways. The court could determine that there is no inconsistency 
and so refuse to issue a declaration of incompatibility. Alternatively, the court 
could issue an authoritative statement (a declaration) that an inconsistency 
exists. As outlined above, this declaration is “enforceable” in so far as it gives 
rise to obligations. What is significant is that either response constitutes an 
answer to whether a law is incompatible with the human rights protected in 
the statute, and the controversy as to this is thereby concluded.  
 
 
 D Can the Mechanism be Distinguished from an 
Advisory Opinion? 
 
Thus far, we have examined whether declarations of incompatibility display 
the key indicia of judicial power. As noted above, this type of analysis only 
partially answers the question of whether the mechanisms involve the use of 
judicial power. To be conclusive, we now examine whether the declaration 
mechanisms can be distinguished from other powers that have been found not 
to invoke judicial power. One such case is when courts are petitioned to 
provide advisory opinions.  
 
An advisory opinion involves “an abstract question, and [is] hypothetical in 
the sense that it was unrelated to any actual controversy between parties”.56 
According to the decision in Mellifont v Attorney-General (Queensland) it 
comprises: 
 
two critical concepts. One is the notion of an abstract question of law 
not involving the right or duty of any body or person; the second is 
the making of a declaration of law divorced or dissociated from any 
attempt to administer it.57 
                                                
56 Mellifont v Attorney-General (Queensland) (1991) 173 CLR 289, 305 per Mason 
CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
57 Ibid, 303 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. 
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The High Court’s approach to advisory opinions adopted in Mellifont was 
shaped by its earlier decision in In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts.58 That 
case made it clear that “advisory opinions” do not involve the exercise of 
federal judicial power. The reason for this is that such opinions do not qualify 
as “matters”, as that term is used in ss 75 and 76 of the Australian 
Constitution. The majority stated:  
 
We do not think that the word “matter” in sec 76 means a legal 
proceeding, but rather the subject matter for determination in a legal 
proceeding. In our opinion there can be no matter within the meaning 
of the section unless there is some immediate right, duty or liability 
to be established by the determination of the Court. If the matter 
exists, the Legislature may no doubt prescribe the means by which 
the determination of the Court is to be obtained, and for that purpose 
may, we think, adopt any existing method of legal procedure or 
invent a new one.59 
 
In combination, these decisions ensure that in order to convince a court that 
declarations of incompatibility can be differentiated from advisory opinions it 
is necessary to demonstrate that such a declaration qualifies as a “matter”.  
 
It is possible to view the making of a declaration as unable to cause any 
change in the law in and of itself. If this view of the mechanism is adopted it 
would be possible to argue that making such declarations does not involve a 
right or duty, or an attempt to administer the law.60 If this is the case 
declarations might be likened to advisory opinions. This is most relevant to 
the New Matilda Bill where “Court” is limited in the proposed legislation to 
courts exercising federal jurisdiction.61 If the declaration mechanism was 
found to be sufficiently akin to an advisory opinion the result would be that 
the federal declaration mechanism would be constitutionally invalid. 
 
If an application for a declaration of incompatibility is not held to be a matter 
it also creates problems for the mechanisms enacted in Victoria and the ACT, 
although these problems are more subtle. For instance, if making a 
                                                
58 Ibid. 
59 (1921) 29 CLR 257 265-266 per Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy, Powers, Rich and Starke 
JJ. 
60 See the discussion by Geoffrey Lindell, “The Statutory Protection of Rights and 
Parliamentary Sovereignty: Guidance from the United Kingdom?” (2006) 17 Public 
Law Review 188, 204-205. 
61 s 5 New Matilda Bill. 
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declaration is not a “matter” the ACT Human Rights Act could not be used in 
cases involving federal jurisdiction. Lindell notes that this would include 
cases where the human rights infringement involved federal legislation. He 
also suggests that the uncertainty which exists about the extent to which the 
ACT Supreme Court exercises federal jurisdiction could prevent declarations 
from being used in cases involving legislation passed by the ACT Legislative 
Assembly (or even the common law) if a piece of federal legislation is the 
ultimate reason the ACT legislation or common law applies in the Territory.62  
 
If the making of a declaration does not constitute a matter it may prevent 
cases where a declaration is made from being appealed to the High Court.63 
This limitation would apply in Victoria because, as the High Court indicated 
in Mellifont v Attorney-General (Queensland), its State appellate jurisdiction 
is only activated by the existence of a matter.64 This could act as a similar 
restriction in regard to the ACT. The High Court in Porter v R; Ex parte 
Yee65 accepted that the jurisdiction to hear appeals from Territory courts can 
be conferred upon the High Court under s 122 of the Constitution. This is 
reflected in s 35AA(1) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), which states that “the 
High Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine appeals from judgments of 
the Supreme Court of a Territory”. 
 
The fact that appellate jurisdiction from Territory courts is conferred on the 
High Court under s 122 and not under Chapter III means that this jurisdiction 
is not expressly limited by the need for a “matter”. However, it is limited by 
the more general qualification that no federal court can be conferred with 
non-judicial power. It may also be that, although there is no express 
requirement for a “matter” in appeals from Territory courts, such appeals will 
nonetheless be held to require this. This is reflected in how the High Court 
has approached its State appellate jurisdiction. Hence, it is prudent, in the 
absence of a finding to the contrary, and given the similarities in the wording 
of s 73 of the Constitution in respect of appeals from State courts and 
35AA(1) of the Judiciary Act in respect of appeals from Territory courts, to 
assume that that the High Court may only determine appeals from Territory 
courts where a ‘matter’ is involved. 
                                                
62 Lindell, above n 60, 207. See also James Stellios “Federal Dimension to the ACT 
Human Rights Act” (2005) 47 AIAL Forum 33, 34. 
63 Lindell, above n 60, 207.  
64 Mellifont v Attorney-General for the State of Queensland (1991) 173 CLR 289, 
305 per Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson, Gaudron and McHugh JJ. See also Leslie Zines, 
Cowen and Zines’s Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (3rd ed 2002), 20. 
65 (1926) 37 CLR 432. 
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This inability to approach the High Court with cases where declarations of 
incompatibility have been issued does not, of itself, mean that the ACT and 
Victorian mechanisms are invalid under the constitutional arrangements 
which govern those jurisdictions. Nevertheless, this inability does place a 
significant practical limitation on the procedure. Preventing the High Court 
from functioning as the final court of appeal in disputes involving 
declarations of incompatibility means that there would be no way to ensure 
that Australian jurisprudence in relation to the remedy develops consistently. 
This could leave the law in relation to this new remedy in an unsatisfactory 
state. 
 
However, it is likely that the mechanisms do involve a “matter”. Despite the 
decision in In Re Judiciary and Navigation Acts, the High Court has been 
prepared to determine questions in which declaratory relief has been sought 
where there has only been a tenuous link to an immediate right or duty.66 
Some of these matters might even have been thought to give rise to an 
abstract question of law.67 In any event, the issuing of a declaration of 
incompatibility, as discussed above, does involve the determination of the 
consistency of disputed legislation with the protected human rights within the 
bounds of an existing conflict between parties. In this, it can be seen to meet 
the matter requirement and goes beyond a mere advisory opinion.  
 
Applying for a declaration of incompatibility can also be seen to constitute a 
“matter” because such a request is not divorced from an attempt to administer 
the law. As outlined above, the ACT, Victorian and proposed federal 
legislation clearly indicate that declarations can only be issued in the context 
of a pre-existing dispute. This supports the argument that the law being 
administered is the law which is alleged to be incompatible with the protected 
human rights. To support this argument, a submission made by Evans and 
Evans on the New Matilda Bill drew a comparison between requesting a court 
to make a declaration of incompatibility and cases where the constitutional 
validity of a piece of legislation is contested. The submission highlighted 
comments in Croome v Tasmania68 that indicate that in cases where the 
constitutionality of a particular law is in question the law that is being 
administered is “the law governing the controversy about the impugned law”. 
                                                
66 See Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119, 125–6 per Brennan CJ, Dawson 
and Toohey JJ. 
67 See Attorney-General (Vic) ex rel Dale v Commonwealth (“Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Case”) (1945) 71 CLR 237, as discussed in Zines, above n 64, 15–16. 
68 Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119, 126 per Brennan CJ, Dawson J and 
Toohey J. See also Evans and Evans, above n 39.  
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The authors of the submission accepted that there is a difference between 
requesting that a court make a declaration of incompatibility and applying to 
a court for a ruling that a particular statute is constitutionally invalid. 
However, they saw sufficient similarity between the two processes to suggest 
that to make a declaration of incompatibility is to “administer a law”.69  
  
Comparable arguments can be made to support the proposition that a request 
for a declaration of incompatibility involves an “immediate right or duty”. 
This would also allow declarations of incompatibility to be distinguished 
from advisory opinions, and qualify as a matter. In the Evans and Evans 
submission on the New Matilda Bill the making of a declaration was 
described as being “essentially, a finding that a right is infringed by the 
incompatible legislation”.70 Moreover, as the foregoing analysis of the 
operation of the various declaratory mechanisms demonstrates, one of the 
outstanding characteristics of the consequences which flow from a court 
issuing a declaration is that certain obligations (or duties) are placed on the 
relevant Attorney-General.71 Lindell extends the idea that these types of 
declarations involve “duties” by referring to cases which suggest that a duty 
falls upon the Crown “to seek a declaration to clarify the law”.72 Evans and 
Evans consider this question from the perspective of the right of the person 
bringing the action. They highlight that the High Court has recognised that 
people are “entitled to know”73 whether a law is constitutionally valid. Again 
arguing by way of analogy, they indicate that a similar “immediate right” to 
know whether a human right is infringed by a particular piece of legislation 
underpins a request for a declaration of incompatibility.74 This ensures that 
any request meets the requirements for a matter. 
 
It remains difficult to predict how this issue would be resolved should the 
question of the constitutional validity of declarations of incompatibility come 
to be adjudicated. This is because the jurisprudence surrounding the “matter” 
concept is complex and is characterised by “a deep division of judicial 
opinion”.75 Mantziaris and McDonald have identified two competing 
                                                
69 Evans and Evans, above n 39. See also Lindell above n 60, 205. 
70 Evans and Evans, above n 39. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Lindell, above n 60, 205.  
73 Croome v Tasmania (1997) 191 CLR 119, 138 per Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ. 
74 Evans and Evans, above n 39. 
75 Christos Mantziaris and Leighton McDonald “Federal judicial review jurisdiction 
after Griffith University v Tang” (2006) 17 Public Law Review, 22. 32. See also 
Lindell, above n 60, 206-207. 
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interpretations of the term emerging from contemporary High Court 
decisions. They have labelled these the “broad” and “narrow” view of what 
constitutes a “matter”.76 They note that under the “broad” reading of the 
concept a “matter” might exist even though there is “no lis inter partes or 
adjudication of rights”. Although the judges who expound that view 
acknowledge that such cases are “exceptional”, they would still be able to be 
classified as “a matter”.77 Conversely, the “narrow view” requires that a 
matter is only established in a proceeding if the “subject matter for 
determination”, the “right duty or liability to be established” and the 
“controversy” that needs to be quelled can each be specifically identified.78 In 
Griffiths v Tang,79 a High Court majority adopted the narrow view. However, 
the analysis we have undertaken demonstrates that there is a strong basis for 
suggesting that the declaration mechanisms would still give rise to a “matter” 
even under the narrow view. 
 
From a policy perspective, the use of a restrictive definition of “matter” to 
prevent a federal court from offering an advisory opinion is justified largely 
because of the dangers associated with asking those courts to declare the law 
on the basis of hypothetical facts.80 This underlying rationale is important 
because the existence (or non-existence) of a concrete fact scenario is a key 
criterion which differentiates advisory opinions from declaratory relief.81 As 
Irving puts it, the situation faced by the court in Croome illuminates this 
difference: a declaration was awarded in that case because the court was 
confronted with (and understood) the “real experience” of Mr Croome living 
under a legal regime which criminalised homosexual conduct.82 The point is 
also illustrated by the contrasting situation before Finn J in Electricity Supply 
Association of Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer 
                                                
76 Ibid., 33-34. 
77 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v B (2004) 
219 CLR 365, 378 per Gleeson CJ and McHugh J and see Mantziaris and McDonald 
above n, 75, 34. 
78 Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (2002) 209 CLR 
372, 405-406 per Gaudron and Gummow JJ. See also Mantziaris and McDonald 
above n 75, 33. 
79 Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99, 131 per Gummow, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ. 
80 John Williams “Re-thinking advisory opinions” (1996) 7 Public Law Review 205, 
206; Lindell above n 60, 206; Irving above n 25,113 and 115.  
81 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 334, 356-357 per Gleeson CJ, 
Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ.  
82 Irving, above n 25, 128 
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Commission.83 His decision makes it plain that courts will be unwilling to 
give declaratory relief in the absence of concrete facts.84 In that case, the 
plaintiff approached the court seeking declarations which would have 
prevented the ACCC from publishing its (untested) views about an 
appropriate interpretation of s 71 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and 
would have endorsed the plaintiff organisation’s right to publish its own 
(contradictory) statements on the interpretation of s 71, some of which would 
have highlighted the errors in the ACCC’s view. In essence the parties’ 
representations proffered competing interpretations of “the possible impact of 
the implied conditions contained in s71 … on electricity supply contracts 
with consumers”.85 Finn J accepted that “unresolved questions” existed in 
relation to the possible existence and effect of these implied conditions. 
However because no actual or prospective contract existed, and neither party 
to the action seeking a declaration was an electricity supplier or an electricity 
consumer, he found that the fact scenario before him was not concrete 
enough to allow him to issue a declaration.86  
 
For Young, cases such as the Electricity Supply Association demonstrate that 
the presence of a specifically defined set of factual circumstances is a “strict” 
limitation that Australian court’s place on their ability to issue declaratory 
relief.87 However this limitation does not affect the declaration mechanisms 
in the Victorian Charter, ACT Human Rights Act and New Matilda Bill. As 
outlined above, the statutes have been drafted to ensure that declarations of 
this type can only be made in the context of a concrete pre-existing dispute.88 
Thus when the court is asked to make declarations that legislation is 
incompatible with the relevant human rights legislation, parties will be 
approaching the court with a “real experience” rather than a hypothetical fact 
scenario. Hence, while the outcome of this issue in the High Court is not 
certain, there are strong arguments that the declaration of incompatibility 
mechanism can be sufficiently differentiated from an advisory opinion on the 
basis that it gives rise to a matter.  
 
 
                                                
83 (2001) 113 FCR 230. 
84 See the discussion in Young , above n 34,44-46. 
85 Electricity Supply Association of Australia Ltd v Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (2001) 113 FCR 230, 233. 
86 Ibid, 265. 
87 Young above n 34, 46. 
88 Lindell makes this point in relation to declarations of incompatibility made under 
the ACT Human Rights Act. Lindell above n 60, 206, and as argued above, the 
Victorian Charter and New Matilda Bill have been drafted in a similar way. 
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E Is Making a Declaration and Exercise of Non-
Judicial Power? 
 
The power to make a declaration of incompatibility could not be conferred on 
a federal court if this involved the court in the exercise of legislative power or 
as part of that process.89 Any suggestion that this is the case can be refuted. 
Courts in performing their role under the relevant human rights statute 
perform a fixedly judicial role. Whilst the statutes create (or anticipate 
creating) an obligation upon the Attorney General to table the declaration and 
present a response to it in parliament,90 the court itself is not involved in that 
process. The obligation resulting from the declaration is merely another form 
of the dialogue which currently exists between courts, the legislature and the 
executive in contexts like judicial review under the Constitution. The role of 
the judiciary ends with the declaration of incompatibility. The human rights 
statutes do not stipulate the kind of response the executive is to give. Clearly, 
the executive is free to respond to the declaration by informing parliament 
that it chooses not to amend the infringing statute. While the experience of 
the operation of the British declaration of incompatibility mechanism 
suggests that in practice it would be unusual for an executive to ignore such a 
declaration91, in legal terms the power to respond legislatively remains solely 
with parliament. 
 
The declaration of incompatibility mechanism can also be distinguished from 
laws which have been invalidated because they require the judiciary to 
become too involved in the activities of the legislature or the executive. This 
was the case in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
                                                
89 See Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 
189 CLR 1, 17 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
90 See s 33(3) of the ACT Human Rights Act s 37 of the Victorian Charter s 52(3) of 
the New Matilda Bill. 
91 According to the Department for Constitutional Affairs, as at 1 August 2006 14 
Declarations of Incompatibility have been made under the Human Rights Act 1998 
(UK), which have not been overturned by the House of Lords. Of these 14 
declarations, 1 is subject to an appeal by the Home Office, and the relevant 
department is still considering the appropriate response to 2 more. Parliament has 
responded to the remaining 11 declarations by amending existing legislation, 
enacting new legislation or proposing to enact new legislation. See Department for 
Constitutional Affairs “People’s Rights, Human Rights, Frequently Asked 
Questions” www.dca.gov.uk/peoples-rights/human-rights/faqs.htm (27 March 2007). 
See also Francesca Klug and Keir Starmer, “Standing Back from the Human Rights 
Act: How Effective is it Five Years On?” [2005] Public Law 716. 
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Affairs.92 In that case it was held that the impugned law put the independence 
of the judiciary at risk because it appointed a judge as the head of an inquiry 
process. The majority judges provided a list of factors which can be used as a 
guide to determine whether public confidence in the judiciary was impaired 
when judges performed non-judicial tasks.93 When these factors are applied 
to the situation of a judge who has been asked to make a declaration of 
incompatibility the stark differences between the two situations can be 
observed. In Wilson it was held that the impugned legislation put the judge in 
that position. More importantly one of the major problems with the position 
of the judge in Wilson was the lack of a requirement that the judge act 
independently.94 By contrast, independence from the executive (and 
legislature) is integral to a power given to a court to declare that a particular 
law passed by parliament is incompatible or inconsistent with the relevant 
human rights legislation. Furthermore, the report in Wilson required the judge 
in question to make overtly “political decisions” about various aspects of the 
land which was the subject of the report.95 In comparison, the choice whether 
to issue a declaration of incompatibility is a legal decision, as a judge will be 
asked to interpret statutes and determine whether they can be read 
harmoniously together. Finally, it is worth remembering that public 
confidence in the British judiciary has not collapsed because those judges 
have been given the power to make similar declarations. Even allowing for 
differences in constitutional structure, this can be seen as an indication that 
making declarations is not so completely antithetical to the typical judicial 
function that making them endangers the reputation of the judiciary. 
 
 
IV IN THE ALTERNATIVE: WHAT IF JUDICIAL POWER IS NOT 
INVOLVED? 
 
As outlined above there are strong arguments to suggest that declarations of 
incompatibility involve the exercise of judicial power. However, as also 
acknowledged, courts determine the existence of judicial power in an 
incremental fashion, and the concept itself has proved incapable of being 
                                                
92 (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
93 Ibid, 17-20 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. See 
also Gerard Carney “Wilson and Kable: The Doctrine of Incompatibility- An 
Alternative to the Separation of Powers” (1997) 13 Queensland University of 
Technology Law Journal 175,180-181. 
94 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs (1996) 189 
CLR 1, 18-19 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
95 Ibid, 19 per Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ. 
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given a fixed meaning. This means that it is possible that a court asked to 
consider these questions might weigh the indicia differently and conclude 
that making declarations is not an exercise of judicial power. Accordingly, 
we consider whether such mechanisms would be constitutionally valid if this 
were the case. 
 
 
 A New Matilda Bill 
 
If declarations of incompatibility are held not to involve the exercise of 
judicial power then the mechanism in the New Matilda Bill will be invalid. 
The Boilermakers” Case recognised that the Australian Constitution 
institutes a strict separation of powers at federal level.96 This structure means 
that courts established under Chapter III are the sole repositories of the 
“judicial power of the Commonwealth”.97 
 
 
 B Victorian Charter 
 
Under the Constitution Act 1975 (Vic) the Victorian parliament has plenary 
power, with s 16 specifying that the “Parliament shall have power to make 
laws in and for Victoria in all cases whatsoever”. More significantly, it has 
been held that the Constitution Act, like the constitutions of others States,98 
does not incorporate a doctrine of separation of powers.99 This means that, 
but for two caveats, the question of whether the declaration mechanism in the 
Victorian Charter requires judicial power is irrelevant to determining 
whether the mechanism is constitutionally valid. Thus, even if the making of 
such a declaration is not an exercise of judicial power, it would still be valid 
under the Victorian Constitution. 
 
                                                
96R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers’ Society of Australia (Boilermakers’ Case) 
(1956) 94 CLR 254. See also Fiona Wheeler, “Due Process, Judicial Power and 
Chapter III in the New High Court” (2004) 32 Federal Law Review 205, 207-209. 
97 Australian Constitution s 71. 
98 See Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, Clyne v 
East (1967) 68 SR(NSW) 385 and Building Construction Employees and Builders’ 
Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 
7 NSWLR 372 as to the Constitution Act 1902 (NSW). 
99 See City of Collingwood v State of Victoria [No 2][1994] 1 VR 652, 662-663 per 
Brooking J. See also Dan Meagher “Should the Victorian Constitution be Reformed 
to Strengthen the Separation of Judicial Power” (2000) 2 Constitutional Law and 
Policy Review 63. 
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The two caveats are as follows. First, if a declaration is not an exercise of 
judicial power then appeals to the High Court from the Victorian Supreme 
Court would be restricted in the same way as would occur if the declaration 
mechanism is found not meet the requirements of a “matter”. As discussed 
earlier, this would restrict the practical utility of the declaration 
mechanism.100 
 
Second, following the decision in Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions 
(NSW),101 the Victorian Supreme Court cannot be vested with jurisdiction by 
the Victorian Parliament that was “incompatible” with the exercise of federal 
judicial power by that Court. Kable placed that restriction on the NSW 
Parliament and Supreme Court even though it was accepted that the 
Constitution Act 1902 (NSW) does not itself entrench a separation of judicial 
power. The limitation derives from the High Court’s recognition that the 
State courts are an integrated part of the Australian judicial system and can be 
required to exercise federal judicial power.102 Moreover, while there were 
suggestions in Kable that the decision only applied to cases where the State 
court was actually exercising federal jurisdiction,103 the High Court has 
subsequently made it clear that the decision operates generally to guarantee 
the impartiality of State courts.104 
 
The implications of the Kable decision have been described as 
controversial105 and they now constitute a constitutional principle that 
prevents State parliaments from passing laws which would result in 
                                                
100 See the discussion of the “matter” concept above. 
101 (1996) 189 CLR 51. 
102 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51,101 per 
Gaudron J and 114 per McHugh J.  
103 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 99 per 
Toohey J. See also Leslie Zines above n 64, 244. 
104 See Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363 per 
Gaudron J and the subsequent endorsement of her comments in North Australian 
Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163 per McHugh, 
Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ. This passage of the judgment is 
more fully quoted below. See also Stephen Donaghue “Judicial Independence: 
Bradley, Fardon and Baker”(Paper presented at the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public 
Law 2005 Constitutional Law Conference, Sydney, 18 February 2005), 3. Paper 
available at 
www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/publications/papers/docs/2005/5_StephenDonaghue.pdf 
(accessed 20 March 2007). 
105 Fiona Wheeler “The Kable Doctrine and State Legislative Power Over State 
Courts” (2005) 20(2) Australasian Parliamentary Review 15 16. 
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“institutional integrity of a court … [being] distorted”.106 In the most recent 
discussion of Kable in Forge v Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission107 the High Court indicated that “the institutional integrity of a 
court is distorted… [when] the body no longer exhibits in some relevant 
respect those defining characteristics which mark a court apart from other 
decision-making bodies”. Following Forge, if Kable is applied to the 
declaration mechanism in the Victorian Charter the question will be: does 
making such a declaration mean that the Supreme Court is no longer acting as 
a court?  
 
Despite the consideration of Kable in Forge it remains unclear precisely what 
characteristics of a court are protected by the Kable doctrine and cannot be 
altered by State legislatures.108 Some guidance might be drawn from the facts 
of the decision in Kable. Kable concerned the Community Protection Act 
1994 (NSW), which empowered the NSW Supreme Court to make 
“preventive detention orders”. This enabled the Supreme Court to order the 
imprisonment of a person although that person had not been found guilty of a 
criminal offence. The Act only applied to one person, s 3(3) providing that: 
“This Act authorises the making of a detention order against Gregory Wayne 
Kable and does not authorise the making of a detention order against any 
other person.” A 4:3 majority of the High Court held, in the words of 
McHugh J, that “the Act is invalid because it purports to vest functions in the 
Supreme Court of New South Wales that are incompatible with the exercise 
of the judicial power of the Commonwealth by the Supreme Court of that 
State”.109 
 
The courts have not set down a definitive list of functions which are 
incompatible with the exercise of judicial power. However, it is clear that an 
incompatible function would be one which prevents judges from exercising a 
non-judicial task that impairs the ability of that judge (or the judiciary as a 
whole) to exercise their judicial duties with integrity. A function may also be 
incompatible if it damages public confidence in the capacity of an individual 
judge or the judiciary as a whole to perform their functions with 
                                                
106 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44, para 
63 per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. See also Wheeler, above n 105, 21- 22. 
107 Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44, para 
63 per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 
108 See Forge v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2006] HCA 44, 
para 64 per Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ. 
109 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 109.  
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“integrity”.110 It was this aspect of the “incompatibility doctrine” which was 
applied in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Affairs.111 As discussed above in that case the High Court held, with Kirby J 
dissenting, that the appointment of Justice Jane Mathews of the Federal Court 
to prepare a report for the Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Affairs under s 10 of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth) was invalid. Brennan CJ, and Dawson, 
Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ found112 that the function of the author of 
a report under s 10 was not an independent one, but a “position equivalent to 
that of a ministerial adviser” which “places the judge firmly in the echelons 
of administration, liable to removal by the minister before the report is made 
and shorn of the usual judicial protections”. This breached the incompatibility 
doctrine in that it undermined “public confidence in the integrity of the 
judiciary as an institution or in the capacity of the individual judge to perform 
his or her judicial functions with integrity”.113 
 
In our earlier discussion of Wilson we advanced the view that the declaration 
mechanism is not itself incompatible with a courts judicial role. Indeed we 
argued that making such a declaration requires courts to independently assess 
the legislation which is held to be incompatible. Therefore, it seems unlikely 
that an argument would succeed that public confidence in the integrity of the 
judiciary is lessened because declarations impair judicial independence.  
 
Further guidance on the extent to which the Kable principle prevents the 
Victorian Parliament from empowering courts with a non-judicial declaration 
mechanism can be gleaned from Fardon v Attorney-General for the State of 
Queensland.114 It indicates that the High Court will be cautious in applying 
Kable. In Fardon, the High Court rejected an attack on the Dangerous 
Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld). It was argued that the Act 
breached Chapter III of the Constitution by involving the Supreme Court of 
Queensland in the process of deciding whether prisoners who had been 
convicted of serious sexual offences should be the subject of continuing 
detention orders on the ground that they represented a serious danger to the 
community. The Court held that the Act did not confer a function on the 
Supreme Court that was incompatible with the Court’s position as a potential 
                                                
110 See for example Grollo v Palmer (1995)184 CLR 348, 364 per Brennan CJ, 
Deane, Dawson and Toohey JJ.  
111 (1996) 189 CLR 1. 
112 Ibid 18–19. 
113 Ibid 16, 18-19. 
114 (2004) 210 ALR 50. 
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repository of federal jurisdiction. The grounds upon which Kable was 
distinguished included that while Kable had concerned a law directed at only 
one person, the Queensland statute was a law of general application. The 
decision established, as McHugh J remarked, that “Kable is a decision of 
very limited application”.115 
 
However limited the Kable principle might now be, it is clear that it could 
still be used to prevent parliaments from bestowing powers on State courts 
which compromise the “institutional integrity” of those courts, such as if the 
power damaged their ability to be, or reputation for being, impartial.116 
Indeed McHugh J said it was precisely because the Queensland statute in 
Fardon did not have this effect that the argument based on the Kable 
principle could not succeed.117 Similarly, Gleeson CJ examined the powers 
given to the Supreme Court of Queensland and could not find anything in the 
Act “to suggest that the Supreme Court is to act as a mere instrument of 
government policy”.118 Callinan and Heydon JJ also affirmed the rationale of 
Kable that a State courts’ “integrity and independence as a court …[is] not 
compromised” and the court remains able “to undertake a genuine 
adjudicative process”. A key reason why the legislation in Fardon did not 
infringe the principle was that it contained processes which bore “the 
hallmarks of traditional judicial forms and procedure”.119 
 
If this form of non-judicial power in Fardon can co-exist compatibly with the 
judicial power exercised by State Courts, then a non-judicial power to make 
declarations of inconsistent interpretation ought to survive any application of 
the Kable principle. Indeed, in our foregoing analysis we have pointed out the 
many parallels which can be drawn between making declarations and other 
tasks which courts have traditionally carried out. These similarities make it 
very unlikely that a declaration of inconsistent interpretation would be 
invalidated by the Kable principle as it is currently applied and understood. 
 
If the declaration mechanism in the Victorian Charter can be shown to 
damage the capacity of the Victorian Supreme Court to act independently and 
impartially, the Kable principle (in the wake of Forge) might be used to 
                                                
115 Fardon v Attorney-General (Queensland) (2004) 210 ALR 50, 65. 
116 See in relation to the situation post Fardon but pre Forge Peter Johnston “State 
Courts and Chapter III of the Constitution: Is Kable’s Case Still Relevant ?” (2005) 
32 University of Western Australia Law Review 211, 230-232.  
117 Fardon v Attorney-General (Queensland) (2004) 210 ALR 50, 62 per McHugh J 
118 Ibid, 57 per Gleeson CJ. 
119 Ibid, 110 per Callinan and Heydon JJ. 
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invalidate it. However, as we have demonstrated, the declaration mechanism 
merely asks the Supreme Court to make an assessment, based on legal 
criteria, of whether a particular piece of Victorian legislation is inconsistent 
with a human right set out in the Victorian Charter. As we have also 
indicated in our discussion contrasting the power to make declarations and 
the situation in Wilson, such an assessment, of its very nature, will require the 
Court to act independently of the executive and legislature that initiated and 
then passed the contested legislation. Finally, the similarities between making 
declarations of inconsistent interpretation and other judicial processes suggest 
that they will not have a detrimental impact on the impartiality (real or 
apparent) of the Court.  
 
 
 C ACT Human Rights Act 
 
 
1 Is there a separation of powers doctrine in the 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act? 
 
The powers of the ACT Legislative Assembly are set out in s 22 of the 
Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 1988 (Cth). This enables 
the Assembly “to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the 
Territory”. These words confer plenary legislative power upon the 
Assembly.120 An Act of the ACT Legislative Assembly will be valid unless a 
separate limitation can be found either in other sections of, or by implication 
from, the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act. A possible 
implication from the Act is that it entrenches a separation of judicial power. 
If the declaration of incompatibility mechanism were held to involve an 
exercise of non-judicial power, this might provide a basis for holding the 
mechanism invalid. 
 
However, in De Domenico v Marshall,121 Miles CJ of the ACT Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
It must be recognized that, in the governmental structure of a 
Territory of the Commonwealth, there is no requirement of a strict 
                                                
120 Any suggestion to the contrary was rejected by the High Court in an analogous 
context in Union Steamship Co of Australia Pty Ltd v King (1988) 166 CLR 1. In 
that case, a unanimous Court held that a similar grant of power to a State confers, 
rather than limits, parliamentary sovereignty. 
121 (1999) 142 ACTR 1, 6. 
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division between judicial power on the one hand and executive or 
administrative power on the other hand. In contrast to the division 
between the judicial and executive power of the Commonwealth, 
created and recognised by the Constitution, particularly Chapter III, 
there appears to be no fetter on the exercise of judicial power by 
executive or administrative bodies created by or under legislation of 
the Commonwealth Parliament pursuant to the power to make laws 
for a Territory pursuant to s 122 of the Constitution. 
 
While this question has not been authoritatively determined, this dicta is 
likely to be correct. It is consistent with the approach taken in Victoria and 
other States. In the case of NSW, this was confirmed by the High Court in 
Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW).122 No separation of judicial 
power was found in that case despite the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1992 
(NSW) amending the NSW Constitution to provide for judicial independence 
and security of tenure. It is unlikely that a doctrine of the separation of 
judicial power would be implied from the Australian Capital Territory 
(Self-Government) Act. 
 
 
2 Does the separation of powers doctrine in Chapter III of 
the Constitution apply? 
 
The High Court accepted in Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex 
parte Eastman123 that the Australian Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act 
was enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament under its power to “make 
laws for the government” of the Territories under s 122 of the Constitution. 
Unlike the powers listed in s 51 of the Constitution, s 122 is not expressed to 
be “subject to this Constitution”. The power conferred by s 122 is generally 
assumed to be a plenary power equivalent to the “peace, order and good 
government” powers assigned to the States by their own Constitution Acts. 
 
However, as Gummow J explained in Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v 
Commonwealth,124 the description of a power as “plenary” does not 
necessarily mean that it is subject to no limitations. It has been held, for 
example, that the Commonwealth’s exclusive power to levy duties of excise 
under s 90 of the Constitution excludes the self-governing Territories just as 
                                                
122 (1996) 189 CLR 51. See the discussion of this case above. 
123 (1999) 200 CLR 322. 
124(1997) 190 CLR 513, 604–5. 
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it excludes the States.125 On the other hand, there is no clear authority on the 
extent to which the power in s 122 is limited by other guarantees, such as that 
of freedom of religion in s 116 of the Constitution. It has also been unclear 
whether laws passed by the ACT Legislative Assembly under the Australian 
Capital Territory (Self-Government) Act are subject to limitations arising 
from the separation of judicial power under the Constitution. 
 
In Spratt v Hermes, Kitto and Taylor JJ accepted the view that the whole of 
Chapter III of the Constitution had no application to judicial power conferred 
by laws made under s 122.126 Other members of the Court were more 
cautious. Barwick CJ and Menzies J , while holding that s 72 was 
inapplicable to judicial appointments in the Territories, denied that this meant 
that Chapter III as a whole had no application.127 This tension has not yet 
been fully resolved by the High Court, making it difficult to determine which 
parts of the Constitution, and especially of Chapter III, apply to the 
Territories. 
 
The finding in Spratt v Hermes, that the requirements of s 72 were not 
applicable to the appointment of an ACT magistrate, was reaffirmed in 
Capital TV and Appliances Pty Ltd v Falconer,128 and extended to the 
appointment of judges of the ACT Supreme Court. The same result was 
reached in Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex parte 
Eastman.129 
 
In Kruger v Commonwealth,130 Dawson J, with whom McHugh J agreed, held 
that “[c]ourts created under s 122 are not federal courts”, and accordingly that 
the doctrine of separate and independent judicial power “has no application in 
the territories”. Brennan CJ applied “the accepted doctrine” to that effect.131 
On the other hand Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ all expressed support 
for the opposite view, though none of them finally decided the issue.132 The 
Court in Kruger was thus evenly divided on the issue. Other more recent 
decisions of the High Court have confirmed the insistence of Barwick CJ in 
Spratt v Hermes that the issue must be fragmented: that is, that not all 
                                                
125 Capital Duplicators Pty Ltd v Australian Capital Territory (No 1) (1992) 177 
CLR 248. 
126 (1965) 114 CLR 226, 251 per Kitto J and 260 per Taylor J 
127 (1965) 114 CLR 226, 245 per Barwick CJ and 269-270 per Menzies J. 
128 (1971) 125 CLR 591. 
129 (1999) 200 CLR 322. 
130 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 62. 
131 Ibid, 44. 
132 Ibid, 84 per Toohey J, 109 per Gaudron J and 162 per Gummow JJ. 
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provisions in Chapter III can be put aside as not “applicable to the 
territories”.133 It is unlikely that Chapter III of the Australian Constitution 
imports a separation of powers doctrine into the constitutional arrangements 
of the ACT. 
 
 
3 Does Kable apply to ACT Courts?  
 
The High Court examined the applicability of Kable to the Territories in 
North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service Inc v Bradley.134 Not 
surprisingly, the High Court was concerned to ensure that Territory courts are 
a functioning part of an integrated Australian judicial system. In that case, the 
Court dealt with the notion, expressed by Gaudron J in Ebner v Official 
Trustee in Bankruptcy,135 that: 
 
Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are necessary for the 
maintenance of public confidence in the judicial system. Because 
State courts are part of the Australian judicial system created by 
Ch III of the Constitution and may be invested with the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth, the Constitution also requires, in 
accordance with Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), 
that, for the maintenance of public confidence, they be constituted by 
persons who are impartial and who appear to be impartial even when 
exercising non-federal jurisdiction. And as courts created pursuant to 
s 122 of the Constitution may also be invested with the judicial 
power of the Commonwealth, it should now be recognised, 
consistently with the decision in Kable, that the Constitution also 
requires that those courts be constituted by persons who are impartial 
and who appear to be impartial. 
 
After quoting this passage, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby, Hayne, Callinan and 
Heydon JJ136 accepted that, like their State court counterparts, Territory 
courts may be invested with federal judicial power. Thus Territory courts also 
need to “be and appear to be” fitting repositories of this power, and this 
“requires discernment of the relevant minimum characteristic of an 
                                                
133 Spratt v Hermes (1965) 114 CLR 226, 245. Compare Northern Territory v 
GPAO (1999) 196 CLR 553 and Re Governor, Goulburn Correctional Centre; Ex 
parte Eastman (1999) 200 CLR 322. 
134 (2004) 218 CLR 146. 
135 (2000) 205 CLR 337, 363. 
136 (2004) 218 CLR 146, 163. 
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independent and impartial tribunal exercising the jurisdiction of the courts 
over which the Chief Magistrate presides”.137 The Court concluded by 
acknowledging that it is impossible to provide definitive guidance as to what 
this minimum might be. However, they endorsed McHugh J’s comments in 
Kable that it would be unacceptable if a Territory court was given: 
 
functions or duties might lead ordinary reasonable members of the 
public to conclude that the [Territory] court as an institution was not 
free of government influence in administering the judicial functions 
invested in the court.138 
 
In the final analysis, the territory law in question (the Magistrates Act (NT)) 
was valid because it did not make the: 
 
magistracy of the territory or the office of the Chief Magistrate 
inappropriately dependent on the legislature or executive of the 
territory in a way incompatible with requirements of independence 
and impartiality. It does not compromise or jeopardise the integrity of 
the territory magistracy or the judicial system. Nor is it apt to lead 
reasonable and informed members of the public to conclude that the 
magistracy of the territory was not free from the influence of the 
other branches of government in exercising their judicial function. To 
the contrary, the legislative requirement of continued attention by the 
executive of the territory to the preservation of adequate 
remuneration of the magistrates, including the Chief Magistrate, is 
apt to defend the interests of judicial independence and impartiality 
which inform the legislation.139 
 
The decision of the High Court in North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid 
Service Inc v Bradley is significant because it establishes that Territory courts 
that may be vested with federal jurisdiction are subject to the Kable 
limitation.140 Accordingly, if the ACT mechanism is held to be an exercise of 
non-judicial power it is possible that it might be invalid due to the application 
of Kable. However, it is probable that the current High Court would apply it 
                                                
137 Ibid. 
138 Ibid, 163. The comments referred to can be found in Kable v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51, 119. 
139 Ibid, 172. 
140 This finding contradicted what many had previously thought to be the case. See 
for example David Mossop, “The Judicial Power of the Australian Capital Territory” 
(1999) 27 Federal Law Review 19, 29. 
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to the ACT courts as it was applied in Fardon and in Forge; that is to say it is 
likely not to operate in this case but only in exceptional circumstances that 
give rise to a clear incompatibility, or where the independence or impartiality 
of the ACT Supreme Court is threatened. 
 
 
 
V CONCLUSION 
 
The ACT Human Rights Act, Victorian Charter and New Matilda Bill present 
a new compromise between the protection of human rights and the 
maintenance of parliamentary sovereignty. The constitutional validity of the 
declaration of incompatibility mechanisms in each must be seen in the light 
of what is still a developing and uncertain jurisprudence on the scope and 
definition of judicial power. Nevertheless, the stronger view is that the 
mechanisms are valid. This is based upon our conclusion that a declaration of 
incompatibility is an exercise of judicial power. If it is not, such a mechanism 
enacted at the federal level would be unconstitutional, while the mechanisms 
enacted in the ACT and Victoria will still likely be valid. 
 
From a normative perspective, there are further good reasons to view the 
mechanism as an exercise of judicial power. As the experience of like 
jurisdictions makes clear, the existence of such a mechanism in the UK and 
New Zealand has proved beneficial in the protection of individual liberties 
while still allowing courts to fulfil their traditional function. The mechanism 
may be novel, but it has not there been seen as unjudicial. 
 
This is consistent with one of the central rationales for the separation of 
judicial power under the Australian Constitution. The doctrine has an 
important role not just in securing judicial independence but in protecting 
individual liberties through the dispersal of power and the application of the 
rule of law. This has been acknowledged in the High Court. In Street v 
Queensland Bar Association,141 for example, Deane J in the context of listing 
a number of rights contained in the Constitution commented: “The most 
important of them is the guarantee that the citizen can be subjected to the 
exercise of Commonwealth judicial power only by the “courts” designated by 
Ch III (s 71)”. Similarly, in Tracey; Ex parte Ryan142 he said that the 
separation of federal judicial power is “the Constitution’s only general 
guarantee of due process”. It would be ironic if a separation of judicial power 
                                                
141 (1989) 168 CLR 461, 521. 
142 (1989) 166 CLR 518, 580. 
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designed to protect the community from the misuse of public power and to 
protect their individual liberties were applied in a narrow and legalistic 
fashion to strike down a mechanism directed to the same objective.  
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